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Implementation security is a critical problem in quantum key distribution (QKD). With the
advent of measurement-device-independent QKD, all security loopholes of the measurement unit
have been closed. Securing the source, however, remains an elusive issue. Despite the tremendous
progress made by developing security proofs that accommodate most typical source imperfections,
such proofs usually disregard the effect of pulse correlations. That is, they disregard the fact that
the state of an emitted signal can depend on the signals selected previously. Here, we close this
gap by introducing a simple yet general method to prove the security of QKD with arbitrary pulse
correlations. Our method is compatible with those security proofs that accommodate all the other
source imperfections, thus paving the way towards achieving implementation security in QKD with
arbitrary flawed devices. Moreover, we introduce a new security proof, which we call the reference
technique, that provides high performance in the presence of source imperfections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to securely exchange cryptographic
keys in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve [1]. Despite the significant progress made in recent years, there is still
a big gap between the information theoretic security promised by the security proofs and the actual security offered
by the practical implementations of QKD. The most pressing problem is the discrepancy between the idealised device
models used in the security proofs and the functioning of the real devices employed in the experiments. This is so
because typical security proofs rely on assumptions to describe the behaviour of these devices and ignore their inherent
imperfections. In practice, any deviation from these theoretical models might open security loopholes that could lead
to side-channel attacks, thus compromising the security of QKD. A possible solution to this problem is to construct
more realistic security proofs that can take into account device flaws. Indeed, lately, there have been notable advances
in this direction. This includes, for example, the proposal of the decoy-state method [2–4], allowing the use of practical
light sources while maintaining a high secret key rate. Also, measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [5]
can effectively eliminate all detector side-channels, and is practical with current technology [6–11]. The missing step
towards achieving implementation security in QKD is to better characterise and secure the parties’ sources.
Security loopholes in the source could emerge from three main causes: from state preparation flaws (SPFs) due
to the finite precision of the modulation devices, from information leakage either due to side-channels arising from
mode dependencies or due to Trojan horse attacks (THAs) [12–16], or they could be caused by undesired classical
correlations between the generated pulses. Mode dependencies of the emitted signals occur when the optical mode
of a pulse depends on Alice’s setting choices. That is, Alice’s setting choices might be encoded in various degrees of
freedom of the generated signals, not only on the desired one. Moreover, Eve can perform a THA by sending bright
light into the source and then observe the back-reflected light to obtain partial information about Alice’s internal
settings. Finally, pulse correlations imply that the state of each pulse depends on the previous setting choices, such
as bit and basis choices.
SPFs can be efficiently treated with the original loss-tolerant (LT) protocol [17]. This is so because in this scheme
the resulting secret key rate is almost independent of source’s flaws. Its main drawback is the requirement that the
single-photon signals can be described by qubit states, which is hard to guarantee in practice due to unavoidable
potential side-channels. To address this limitation, a generalisation of the LT protocol was put forward very recently
[18]. Remarkably, this latter protocol encompasses SPFs, mode dependencies and THAs without requiring detailed
information about the state of the side-channels, which simplifies their experimental characterisation. There are also
other techniques that can deal with mode dependencies and THAs, such as the Lo-Preskill’s (LP) analysis presented
in [19], which is essentially based on the GLLP security proof [20], or the numerical approaches introduced in [21–23].
The final piece towards guaranteeing implementation security is thus to consider pulse correlations among the emit-
ted signals. These pulse correlations are purely classical and they arise from the limitations of practical modulators.
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2In general, due to memory effects of these modulation devices, the state of a pulse depends not only on the actual
modulation setting but also on the previous ones, meaning that the secret key information, i.e., the bit and the basis
choices, is encoded not only into a single pulse but also between subsequent pulses. Theoretically, it is believed that
this correlation is very hard to model because the dimensionality of the state space becomes very large. In fact, all
existing security proofs circumvent this imperfection by simply neglecting it, which means that they cannot guarantee
the security of practical implementations. We remark that a few recent works [24–26] have incorporated in their
analysis certain pulse correlations between the emitted signals. However, all these works only consider restricted
scenarios. In particular, the results in [24, 25] and in [26] only consider setting-choice-independent pulse correlations
and intensity correlations between neighbouring pulses, respectively. Therefore, none of them can deal with pulse
correlations in terms of the secret key information nor with long range correlations. Another reason why these cor-
relations have been ignored so far is because one expects that, in practice, they are small. Importantly, however, a
small imperfection does not necessarily mean a small impact on the secret key rate, as Eve could in principle enhance
such imperfection by exploiting say channel loss, resulting in a poor secret key rate [20]. Therefore, we note that
pulse correlations could be a serious threat to the security of QKD.
In this paper, we present a general and simple framework to guarantee the security of QKD in the presence of
arbitrary pulse correlations. The key idea is very easy yet very useful, that is, we regard the leaked information
encoded into the correlations of subsequent pulses as a side-channel for each of the pulses. Effectively, we show that
the presence of pulse correlations in QKD can be modelled by considering the preparation of states which are more
orthogonal than the original ones but do not contain pulse correlations. Key features of our method include: (1) when
combined with the generalised loss-tolerant (GLT) protocol [18], it can guarantee the security of QKD with practical
devices that suffer from most source imperfections, i.e., SPFs and side-channels (including mode dependencies, THAs
and pulse correlations), even if the precise state of the side-channels is unknown; (2) due to its simplicity, our method
is compatible with many other security proofs including those based on the inner product structure of the emitted
pulses such as, for instance, the LP analysis [19] and the numerical techniques in [21–23]; and (3) our method can be
applied to many QKD protocols such as, for example, the BB84 scheme [27], the six-state protocol [28], the SARG04
protocol [29], distributed-phase-reference protocols [30–32] and MDI-QKD [5]. Our results indicate the feasibility of
secure QKD with arbitrary flawed devices, and therefore they constitute an essential step towards closing the big gap
between theory and practice in QKD.
Also, a second contribution of this work is a new security proof, which we call the reference technique (RT), that can
provide high performance in the presence of source imperfections. The key idea is to consider some reference states,
which are close to the actual states prepared by the protocol of interest, as intermediate parameters in the security
proof. We remark that such proof is compatible with a number of existing security proofs. In this work, we rigorously
prove the physical intuition that if two QKD protocols employ similar states, then the mathematical expression for
their phase error rate (or the min-entropy) should also be similar and thus also their secret key rate formula. In doing
so, we can prove the security of the protocol of interest by considering the reference states. By using this simple and
intuitive RT, we evaluate the secret key rate of the original LT protocol [17] with pulse correlations. As a result, we
obtain secret key rates that significantly outperform those that could be derived from, for example, the LP analysis
[19] and the GLT protocol [18].
II. RESULTS
Pulse correlations occur, for instance, when the emitted signals depend on the previous values of the encoding
device (e.g., a phase modulator). In other words, subsequent pulses leak information about Alice’s former encoding
choices. The key idea of our work to evaluate this complex scenario is to interpret these correlations as a side-channel.
By realistically modelling the source, we can bound this passive leakage of information and ensure secure QKD after
performing enough privacy amplification. In what follows, we first outline the assumptions used in our security
analysis, which is presented afterwards.
A. Assumptions on Alice’s and Bob’s devices
Here, we describe the assumptions considered throughout the paper. For this, we introduce the concept of an m-
state protocol, which represents a family of QKD protocols where the legitimate users employ m states. In particular,
we assume an m-state protocol in which modulation devices are used to encode the bit and the basis choices. For
simplicity, we do not explicitly consider the use of the decoy-state method [2–4]. However, we remark that our
framework could be combined with the decoy state method and also incorporate the effect of correlated intensity
3modulators as well as other imperfections of the intensity modulators [15]. Furthermore, we assume an asymptotic
scenario where Alice sends Bob an infinite number of pulses.
Additional assumptions might be required depending on the particular security proof technique that is combined
with our method. For instance, if the GLT protocol [18] or the RT based on the original LT protocol [17] (see the
Methods section) are used, one also needs to assume that certain information about the states prepared by Alice is
known. To be precise, for a setting choice j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X} (i.e., m = 3 in this case) made for the kth pulse, Alice
prepares systems CkBkE in the following pure state
|ψj〉CkBkE = aj |φj〉CkBk |φ〉E +
√
1− aj2 |φ⊥j 〉CkBkE , (1)
and then she sends systems Bk and E to Bob over a quantum channel. In this equation, we need to know a lower
bound on the coefficient aj (here, we take aj as a non-negative number satisfying 0 ≤ aj ≤ 1, which is possible by
appropriately choosing the phase of the states in Eq. (1)) and a full characterisation of the density operator of the
qubit Bk derived from the state |φj〉CkBk . We note, however, that the latter assumption can be relaxed by using the
work in [24, 25]. The subscript CkBkE stands for all the systems that Alice prepares depending on j, which include
not only the kth qubit (system Bk) that she sends to Bob but also the system Ck, which is needed for purifying the
state of system Bk, and E is Eve’s system. System E includes the systems sent by Alice and the ancilla systems
kept in Eve’s lab. Most importantly, we remark that Eq. (1) shows the most general state that can be prepared in a
QKD protocol, representing most of the imperfections that a source possibly entails. This is so because we include
Alice’s and Eve’s ancilla systems, thus purifying the state. Also, Eq. (1) simply decomposes a state |ψj〉CkBkE in a
given Hilbert space into a direct sum of two states, one of them in a qubit space, which can always be done for an
appropriate choice of aj with 0 ≤ aj ≤ 1.
Moreover, in Eq. (1), |φ〉E represents the part of Eve’s states that is independent of Alice’s setting choice j,
while the information leakage to Eve is expressed by |φ⊥j 〉CkBkE , the state of the side-channels, which corresponds
to unwanted and unknown modes. Note that, |φ⊥j 〉CkBkE can take any form in any-dimensional Hilbert space and
its characterisation is not required for these security analyses. This generality is achieved because the GLT protocol
and the RT based on the original LT protocol assume the worst case scenario, where 〈φ⊥j′ |φ⊥j 〉CkBkE = 0 for all
j, j′ ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X} with j 6= j′. We emphasise that this latter assumption never underestimates Eve’s ability to obtain
information about j, since a set of less orthogonal states can always be constructed from a set of more orthogonal
states with unit probability. Therefore, whatever Eve could do in this worst case scenario is always possible also
with the actual states, and thus the security proof based on the worst case scenario completely covers that based on
the actual states. Finally, we remark again that by using Eq. (1), the results introduced in [18] already take into
account any side-channel information except for pulse correlations. The main contribution of our work is to show
that one can also accommodate the effect of pulse correlations through the parameter aj in Eq. (1). Hence, our work
demonstrates that most source imperfections, i.e., SPFs and side-channels, can be taken into account in an m-state
protocol through this parameter.
The assumptions on Bob’s devices also depend on the security proof. For example, in the case of the GLT protocol,
one assumes that Bob measures the incoming pulses in the Z or the X basis. More precisely, Bob’s measurements are
represented by the positive-operator valued measures (POVMs) {Mˆ0Z , Mˆ1Z , Mˆf} and {Mˆ0X , Mˆ1X , Mˆf}, respectively.
Here, Mˆαβ corresponds to Bob obtaining the bit value α ∈ {0, 1} when selecting the basis β ∈ {Z,X}, and Mˆf is
associated with an inconclusive outcome. That is, we assume that these measurements satisfy the basis independent
efficiency condition, because we impose that the operator Mˆf is the same for both basis. Note that, this condition is
usually employed in security proofs to remove detector side-channel attacks exploiting channel loss [33, 34], however,
it is not necessary in MDI-QKD, to which our framework also applies. Furthermore, we emphasise that our method to
deal with pulse correlations could be used as well with security proofs where the basis independent efficiency condition
is not guaranteed, such as in [35].
B. Security analysis in the presence of pulse correlations
In this section, we present the security analysis of QKD with pulse correlations. For this, we consider a security
proof with the following properties. It employs an entanglement-based virtual protocol where Alice prepares pulses
in an entangled state, and she (Bob) measures the local (incoming) systems to distil a secret key. Also, it considers
a particular detected pulse to estimate the principal quantities in the security proof, such as the phase error rate
or the min-entropy. Security against coherent attacks can then be guaranteed with the help of Azuma’s inequality
[36] or by applying the techniques in [37, 38]. Moreover, we assume that the security proof can be generalised such
that it applies to a particular pulse with a side-channel. That is, it can be used to prove the security of QKD in
4the presence of active and/or passive information leakage. Thanks to the reduction technique presented below, a
particular pulse affected by correlations can be regarded as a pulse with a side-channel, and therefore the security of
QKD with pulse correlations is guaranteed. As an example, we demonstrate below that running an m-state protocol
in the presence of nearest neighbour pulse correlations can be regarded as an m-state protocol in which each of the
pulses entails side-channels. We emphasise, however, that it is straightforward to generalise this reduction technique
to arbitrarily long range correlations (see the Methods section for more details).
Nearest neighbour pulse correlations
Let {|ψj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m be the set of m quantum states used in the m-state protocol. We assume that Alice chooses|ψj〉B with probability pj and sends the pulse prepared in the chosen state to Bob over a quantum channel. As for
Bob’s measurements, as already mentioned above, the assumptions vary according to the selected security proof. In
an entanglement-based picture with nearest neighbour pulse correlations, the transmission of n pulses by Alice can
be described by first preparing n ancilla systems A and n pulses in the state
|Ψ〉AB =
∑
j1
|j1〉A1 |ψj1〉B1
∑
j2
|j2〉A2 |ψj2|j1〉B2 . . .
∑
jn
|jn〉An |ψjn|jn−1〉Bn , (2)
and then by sending system B to Bob. In Eq. (2), A = A1, A2, ..., An (B = B1, B2, ..., Bn) refers to the composite
system of Alice’s ancilla systems (Bob’s pulses), where Ak (Bk) for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} denotes Alice’s kth ancilla system
(Bob’s kth pulse), the index jk ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, and {|jk〉Ak}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m} is a set of unnormalised orthogonal states
with || |jk〉Ak || =
√
pj . Importantly, |ψjk|jk−1〉Bk represents any nearest neighbour classical pulse correlation, namely,
this is the state of the kth emitted pulse when Alice selects the setting jk, given that her previous setting choice was
jk−1.
Now, suppose that after Alice sends Bob system B, Bob obtains click events for some of the received signals. Then,
Alice and Bob perform fictitious measurements on their systems to generate the raw data in the experiment. We are
interested in the state of their kth systems just before the fictitious measurements, which resulted in a click at Bob’s
detectors. To obtain this state, recall that any operations and measurements on system B, including the detection
measurements on the pulses received by Bob, commute with Alice’s measurements. Hence, we can assume that Alice
has already measured her first k − 1 ancillas. Then, we have the resulting state as
|j′1〉A1 |ψj′1〉B1 . . . |j
′
k−1〉Ak−1 |ψj′k−1|j′k−2〉Bk−1
∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk
⊗
∑
jk+1
|jk+1〉Ak+1 |ψjk+1|jk〉Bk+1 . . .
∑
jn
|jn〉An |ψjn|jn−1〉Bn , (3)
where j′1, · · · , j′k−1 represent the outcomes of Alice’s measurement on her first k − 1 ancillas. To simplify this state,
we introduce the following definition
|jk+1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+2,··· ,Bn := |jk+1〉Ak+1
∑
jk+2
|jk+2〉Ak+2 |ψjk+2|jk+1〉Bk+2 . . .
∑
jn
|jn〉An |ψjn|jn−1〉Bn , (4)
which forms a set of orthogonal bases as {|jk+1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+2,··· ,Bn}jk+1=1,··· ,m. Also, we define the state
|λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn :=
∑
jk+1
|jk+1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+2,··· ,Bn, |ψjk+1|jk〉Bk+1 . (5)
By using the above two states, we can rewrite Eq. (3) as
|j′1〉A1 |ψj′1〉B1 . . . |j
′
k−1〉Ak−1 |ψj′k−1|j′k−2〉Bk−1
∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn . (6)
As a reference, recall that if there were no pulse correlations in the m-state protocol, the resulting state, instead of
being in the form given by Eq. (6), would become
|j′1〉A1 |ψj′1〉B1 . . . |j
′
k−1〉Ak−1 |ψj′k−1〉Bk−1
∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk〉Bk |λ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn , (7)
where the state |λ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn is independent of Alice’s setting choice jk, and can be expressed as
|λ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn =
∑
jk+1
|jk+1〉Ak+1 |ψjk+1〉Bk+1 . . .
∑
jn
|jn〉An |ψjn〉Bn . (8)
5In the security proof for the m-state protocol without pulse correlations, one typically obtains the phase error
rate (or the min-entropy) by considering any attack on system Bk in
∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk〉Bk in Eq. (7). On the other
hand, when there are nearest neighbour pulse correlations, one can see from Eq. (6) that Alice’s information jk is
encoded not only on system Bk but also on the systems Bk+1, · · · , Bn, and the state |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn,
serves as side-channel information about the state |ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk . This suggests that, if we obtain the phase er-
ror rate (or the min-entropy) by considering any attack on the composite systems Bk and Bk+1, · · · , Bn in∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn , then the security follows. In other words, the m-state pro-
tocol with pulse correlations can be simply regarded as an m-state protocol where Alice prepares the states
{|ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m} for any k and sends systems Bk, Bk+1, · · · , Bn to Bob. In gen-
eral, the states {|ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m} are more orthogonal than the states without pulse
correlations, {|ψjk〉Bk}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m}, and they depend on the previous information j′k−1. The latter might suggest
that Alice needs to keep a record of the information j′k−1 in the actual protocol. However, one can remove this
requirement by fictitiously imagining that Eve knows the setting choices of the previous j′k−1 pulses and by con-
sidering a set of states {|ξjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m} that is more orthogonal than any of the possi-
ble sets labelled by j′k−1. That is, by considering a set of states {|ξjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m} such
that the inner product of any pair of states within the set is equal or smaller than that of the equivalent pair of
states in the original set {|ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m}. As explained before, this considera-
tion never underestimates Eve’s ability since she can always make those states less orthogonal. This means that
in order to prove the security of QKD with pulse correlations it suffices to prove the security of QKD with inde-
pendently distributed states {|ξjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m} that are more orthogonal than the original
correlated states. This is a key point in our method and is illustrated in Fig. 1. For a concrete example of the state
{|ξjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m}, refer to Eq. (13) in the next section.
Note that, our framework is also valid for the case where Alice emits mixed states instead of pure states. The
emission of mixed states might happen due to imperfections in Alice’s devices or when the prepared pure states are
entangled with Eve’s systems due to say a THA. To treat this latter scenario, the mixed states can be purified by
introducing an ancilla system Ck, with k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, which contains Alice’s and Eve’s systems. As a result,
Eq. (6) becomes
|j′1〉A1 |ψj′1〉C1B1 . . . |j
′
k−1〉Ak−1 |ψj′k−1|j′k−2〉Ck−1Bk−1
∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk|j′k−1〉CkBk |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Ck+1Bk+1,··· ,CnBn . (9)
Again, if a security proof for the m-state protocol without pulse correlations shows that one
can estimate the phase error rate (or the min-entropy) for
∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk〉CkBk , it follows that∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk|j′k−1〉CkBk |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Ck+1Bk+1,··· ,CnBn is also secure if one can obtain the parameters needed for
the security proof given these latter states. More precisely, in the case of mixed states, to prove the security of QKD
in the presence of pulse correlations one needs to prove the security of an m-state protocol that emits the states
{|ξjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,CkBk,Ck+1Bk+1,··· ,CnBn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m}.
Finally, we remark that, only for the purpose of estimating the phase error rate (or the min-entropy), in some
cases it may make the mathematical analysis simpler to fictitiously consider an arbitrary attack on the systems
Ak+1, · · · , An (which, in reality, are inaccessible by Eve) besides the composite systems Bk and Bk+1, · · · , Bn. Note
No	pulse	correlations Pulse	correlations
Figure 1: Diagram illustrating the key point of our method to deal with pulse correlations. When there are no pulse
correlations, Alice prepares and sends Bob the states {|ψjk〉Bk}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m} for any pulse k, where jk is Alice’s setting
choice and m is the number of encoding choices. In the presence of pulse correlations, however, the prepared states can
be regarded as the states {|ξjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{1,2,··· ,m}, where the information about jk is also encoded
in subsequent pulses. By proving the security of a protocol employing the latter states, which are independently
distributed (i.e., they are not correlated with other pulses), one proves the security of QKD in the presence of pulse
correlations.
6that, the number of systems that we include as side-channels does not matter, but what matters is how much the
state |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn depends on Alice’s information jk. Therefore, such fictitious attack on Ak+1, · · · , An
should not result in general in a lower key rate because these ancillas do not directly entail information about jk.
C. Particular device model
Having stated the framework for the security proof in the presence of pulse correlations, we now consider a particular
device model with only nearest neighbour pulse correlations. Moreover, we consider the LT protocol (i.e., the three-
state protocol) [17], and apply both the GLT analysis [18], and the RT based on the original LT protocol (described
in the next section), as the security proofs. They both require a state in the general form of Eq. (1). The purpose
of this section is to show how to obtain the parameters needed in this equation for a particular device model. We
remark that, for simplicity, below we do not consider THAs or mode dependencies. However, they could readily be
included by using the method in [18]. Also, we assume that a single-photon source is available, and as a concrete
example for modelling pulse correlations, we select the following nearest neighbour pulse correlation
|ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk =
√
1−  |ψjk〉Bk + e
iθjk|j′k−1
√
 |ψ⊥jk〉Bk , (10)
for the three states. Here, |ψjk〉Bk is a qubit state with jk ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, the parameter  intuitively quantifies
the strength of the correlation, θjk|j′k−1 represents how the k
th state depends on the previous information j′k−1, and
|ψ⊥jk〉Bk is a state in the qubit space that is orthogonal to |ψjk〉Bk . Eq. (10) means that the stronger the correlation
between pulses (i.e., the greater the value of the parameter ) is, the more information is leaked to the eavesdropper
through the state |ψ⊥jk〉Bk . The physical intuition of this model derives from the functioning of a phase modulator.
To be precise, the state of an emitted pulse is typically affected by the modulation of the previous pulses such that
there is a deviation in its pre-selected phase, which is quantified in the example given in Eq. (10) by θjk|j′k−1 .
Below, we show how to derive the state in the form of Eq. (1) starting from Eq. (10). For this, we follow the idea
introduced in the previous section and obtain the states |ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk |λjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn in Eq. (6). By using
Eq. (10), we have that
|ψjk|j′k−1〉Bk
∑
jk+1
|jk+1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+2,··· ,Bn |ψjk+1|jk〉Bk+1
=
(√
1−  |ψjk〉Bk + e
iθjk|j′k−1
√
 |ψ⊥jk〉Bk
)
⊗
∑
jk+1
|jk+1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+2,··· ,Bn
(√
1−  |ψjk+1〉Bk+1 + e
iθjk+1|jk
√
 |ψ⊥jk+1〉Bk+1
)
=: (1− ) |ψjk〉Bk |φ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn +
√
1− (1− )2 |ψ⊥jk|j′k−1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn , (11)
where
|φ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn =
∑
jk+1
|jk+1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+2,··· ,Bn |ψjk+1〉Bk+1 , (12)
is a normalised state independent of the information jk and, therefore, |ψjk〉Bk |φ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn is a qubit state
(note that, the set {|ψjk〉Bk |φ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{0Z ,1Z ,0X} is a qubit), and |ψ⊥jk|j′k−1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn
is a state orthogonal to this qubit state. The explicit form of |ψ⊥jk|j′k−1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn is omitted here for
simplicity but it could be straightforwardly obtained from Eq. (11). Importantly, we can regard our protocol as a
protocol that uses the states in Eq. (11) rather than the original states |ψjk〉Bk for any k. Note that, as before, only the
parameter  and the state |ψjk〉Bk need to be characterised. Also, we emphasise once again that the parameter  and
the state |ψ⊥jk|j′k−1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn in Eq. (11) represent most of the source imperfections (i.e., SPFs, mode
dependencies and THAs) [18], not only pulse correlations. This comes from the generality of Eq. (1). Moreover, by
assuming the worst case scenario where the set {|ψ⊥jk|j′k−1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn}jk∈{0Z ,1Z ,0X} forms an orthonormal
basis we never underestimate Eve’s ability. Therefore, to simplify the analysis, we assume this orthogonality in terms
of the side-channel information. Note that, our analysis is valid for any orthonormal basis (i.e., our analysis only uses
7the information about the inner product when we consider the states |ψ⊥jk|j′k−1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn), and therefore
we can omit the dependence on the value of j′k−1 from the states |ψ⊥jk|j′k−1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn , as explained in
the previous section. Furthermore, since the state |φ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn is independent of jk, for the calculations
we can re-express the state in Eq. (11) as
(1− ) |ψjk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn +
√
1− (1− )2 |ψ⊥jk〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn , (13)
with jk ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}. By regarding the state shown in Eq. (13) as the state |ξjk〉Ak+1,...,An,Bk,Bk+1,...,Bn for the k
th
pulse, which is the crucial idea illustrated in Fig. 1, our formalism to deal with pulse correlations can be used directly
with both the GLT protocol and the RT based on the original LT protocol, since the states in Eq. (13) are in the
form of Eq. (1).
In this section, we restricted the discussion to the case of nearest neighbour pulse correlations, but our formalism
also applies to arbitrarily long range correlations. For instance, these correlations could be characterised by∣∣
Bk 〈ψjk|jk−1,··· ,jw+1,j˜w,jw−1,··· ,j1 |ψjk|jk−1,··· ,jw+1,jw,jw−1,··· ,j1〉Bk
∣∣2 ≥ 1− k−w, (14)
for any w and k with w < k, where j˜w represents a different setting choice to jw. That is, the correlation could be
characterised through the response according to the change of the wth index. In other words, we can quantify the
correlation represented by k−w, where k − w is the range of the correlation, by looking at the distinguishability of
the states. One can show that, from this model, it is straightforward to obtain the three states in the form given by
Eq. (1) (see the Methods section for more details) and consequently apply the selected security proof.
D. Reference technique based on the original loss-tolerant protocol
In this section, we outline the intuition behind the key idea of the RT by applying it to the original LT protocol [17].
To simplify the discussion, we shall assume collective attacks, however, our analysis can be generalised to coherent
attacks (see the Methods section for more details). Just as an example, we consider a protocol with a single-photon
source in the presence of side-channel information, such as pulse correlations, in which Alice prepares the following
three states for each pulse emission
|Ψj〉B = (1− ) |ψj〉B +
√
1− (1− )2 |ψ⊥j 〉B , (15)
where B denotes the system to be sent to Bob. We remark that this subscript B could be replaced with
Ak+1, · · · , An, Bk, Bk+1, · · · , Bn and then we would recover Eq. (13). However, in this section we prefer to use
Eq. (15) rather than Eq. (13) because the RT is general and applies as well to a scenario with any type of side-
channels, not only a side-channel arising from pulse correlations. In Eq. (15), j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, {|ψ⊥j 〉B}j∈{0Z ,1Z ,0X}
is an orthonormal basis for the side-channels, and the qubit state |ψj〉B is defined by [18]
|ψ0Z 〉B = |0Z〉B ,
|ψ1Z 〉B = − sin
(
δ
2
)
|0Z〉B + cos
(
δ
2
)
|1Z〉B ,
|ψ0X 〉B = cos
(
pi
4
+
δ
4
)
|0Z〉B + sin
(
pi
4
+
δ
4
)
|1Z〉B ,
(16)
where {|0Z〉 , |1Z〉} is a qubit basis and δ(≥ 0) is the deviation of the phase modulation from the intended value due to
SPFs [18]. That is, when there is no side-channel information, the states of the single-photons sent by Alice have the
form given by Eq. (16), but in the presence of side-channel information, however, these states are defined by Eqs. (15)
and (16). As a result, {|ψ⊥j 〉B}j∈{0Z ,1Z ,0X} is no longer a qubit.
To prove the security of this protocol we need to evaluate its phase error rate. The key idea of the RT is to
consider the phase error rate estimation that we would obtain if we replace the actual set of states of the protocol,
{|Ψ0Z 〉B , |Ψ1Z 〉B , |Ψ0X 〉B}, with another set of states, which we call the reference states. The reference states need
to be selected such that they are similar to the actual states and there is a simple relationship between the events
associated with them. Being the intuition that since the actual and the reference states are close to each other, one
should be able to obtain a relationship between the events associated with the actual states by slightly modifying
the relationship for the reference states. Here, we select the reference states to be linearly dependent states such
8that unambiguous state discrimination (USD) [40, 41] is not possible. This allows us to use directly the original LT
protocol [17] to estimate precisely some quantities associated with the reference states and their relationship, as an
intermediate step towards obtaining the phase error rate associated with the actual states.
As an example, we select the reference states to be {|Ψ0Z 〉B , |Ψ1Z 〉B , |Φ0X 〉B} with |Φ0X 〉B described below, and
we fictitiously consider that Alice chooses these states with the same probabilities as the actual states. That is, we
borrow |Ψ0Z 〉B and |Ψ1Z 〉B directly from the actual states and define a qubit space spanned by {|Ψ0Z 〉B , |Ψ1Z 〉B}.
The state |Φ0X 〉B is obtained for example by projecting |Ψ0X 〉B into the qubit space spanned by {|Ψ0Z 〉B , |Ψ1Z 〉B}.
Then, by exploiting the fact that the reference states are all qubit states, one can follow the idea of the original LT
protocol [17]. In doing so, we obtain
Y
(Z)es
sX ,αX |Ref = PZAPZBAα
[
qsX |Id + P
αX ,es
x qsX |x + P
αX ,es
z qsX |z
]
, (17)
Y
(β)obs
sX ,αβ |Ref = PαβAPXB
[
qsX |Id + P
αβ ,obs
x qsX |x + P
αβ ,obs
z qsX |z
]
, (18)
where Y
(Z)es
sX ,αX |Ref with s, α ∈ {0, 1} is the joint probability (i.e., the yield) that Alice prepares a state in the Z basis,
both Alice and Bob measure their systems (defined in an entanglement-based virtual protocol for the security proof)
in the X basis, Alice (Bob) obtains the bit value α (s), conditional on selecting the reference states. These are the
probabilities required to estimate the phase error rate; since they are associated with quantities we need to estimate,
we append “es” as a superscript. Similarly, Y
(β)obs
sX ,αβ |Ref with αβ ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X} is the joint probability (i.e., the yield)
that Alice prepares a state corresponding to selecting the setting αβ , Bob chooses the X basis and obtains the bit
value s, conditional on selecting the reference states. These probabilities are related with the quantities that would
be directly observed in an experiment employing the reference states, thus we append “obs” as a superscript. Note
that, in Eqs. (17) and (18) we redefine Alice’s setting choice j as αβ to be able to refer to the basis choice and the bit
value separately. Moreover, PZ (PX) is the probability of choosing the Z (X) basis, with the subscript A (B) that
appears in Eqs. (17) and (18) referring to Alice (Bob), Pαβ = Pj , Aα =
1
2
[
1− (−1)α(1− )2 sin δ2
]
, PαX ,est (P
αβ ,obs
t )
with t ∈ {Id, x, z} are the coefficients of the Bloch vector associated with the estimated (observed) quantity (see the
Methods section for their explicit form) and qsX |t can be regarded as the transmission rates of the Pauli operator σˆt.
See [17] for more details. Importantly, by solving the set of linear equations given by Eq. (18) for αβ ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X},
one can express the transmission rates qsX |t in terms of the observed quantities Y
(β)obs
sX ,αβ |Ref as[
qsX |Id, qsX |x, qsX |z
]
=
[
Y
(Z)obs
sX,0Z |Ref
P0ZPXB
,
Y
(Z)obs
sX,1Z |Ref
P1ZPXB
,
Y
(X)obs
sX,0X |Ref
P0XPXB
] [
V T0Z , V
T
1Z , V
T
0X
]−1
, (19)
where Vαβ =
[
1, P
αβ ,obs
x , P
αβ ,obs
z
]
and T means transpose. By plugging the expressions of qsx|t given by Eq. (19)
into Eq. (17), we obtain a relationship between the phase error probabilities Y
(Z)es
sX ,αX |Ref and the yields associated to
the events that would be observed in an experiment employing the reference states Y
(β)obs
sX ,αβ |Ref . Note, however, that
we have no access to the yields of this fictitious experiment because in the actual experiment we use the actual states.
Fortunately, by exploiting the closeness between the reference and the actual states, we can obtain bounds on the
actual yields and consequently the phase error rate of the actual protocol.
To find these bounds, we consider how much the yields for the actual states can deviate from those for the reference
states. To begin with, recall that the first two reference states, |Ψ0Z 〉B and |Ψ1Z 〉B , are equal to the actual states.
Therefore, we have that
Y
(Z)obs
sX ,0Z |Act = Y
(Z)obs
sX ,0Z |Ref , (20)
Y
(Z)obs
sX ,1Z |Act = Y
(Z)obs
sX ,1Z |Ref , (21)
where Y
(Z)obs
sX ,0Z |Act and Y
(Z)obs
sX ,1Z |Act represent the actual yields. Similarly, by recalling that the phase errors are defined
by using the states |Ψ0Z 〉B and |Ψ1Z 〉B , we have that
Y
(Z)es
sX ,αX |Act = Y
(Z)es
sX ,αX |Ref . (22)
Importantly, we remark that the relationship between the parameters qsX |Id, qsX |x, qsX |z, and Y
(Z)es
sX ,αX |Act is the same
as that between qsX |Id, qsX |x, qsX |z, and Y
(Z)es
sX ,αX |Ref thanks to Eq. (22).
9Next, we consider the difference between the yields of the states |Ψ0X 〉B and |Φ0X 〉B . In particular, we consider
the maximum deviation between |Ψ0X 〉B and |Φ0X 〉B in terms of the probability of obtaining an outcome from
some measurement. That is, we consider the maximisation, over any measurement, of |P (l| |Ψ0X 〉B)− P (l| |Φ0X 〉B)|,
where P (l| |Ψ0X 〉B) (P (l| |Φ0X 〉B)) is the probability of obtaining the measurement outcome l given the state |Ψ0X 〉B
(|Φ0X 〉B). For this, we introduce an ancilla system in the state |0〉E and consider the most general measurement that
can be performed on |Ψ0X 〉B |0〉E and |Φ0X 〉B |0〉E , which is simply a projection measurement. The maximisation
is then rather straightforward, and we find that |P (l| |Ψ0X 〉B |0〉E) − P (l| |Φ0X 〉B |0〉E)| ≤ 1 − |B 〈Φ0X |Ψ0X 〉B |2.
Importantly, no measurement, including any measurement performed by Eve, can induce a larger deviation. Note
that, here one could also use the trace distance argument [15], however, for the problem at hand, that bound is loose
and, therefore, we employ a tighter bound. In fact, the bound suggested in this work could be used to improve the
results in [15, 16]. The deviation between the states |Ψ0X 〉B and |Φ0X 〉B indicates that the inequality in terms of the
yields is ∣∣∣Y (X)obssX ,0X |Act − Y (X)obssX ,0X |Ref ∣∣∣ ≤ p0X (1− |B 〈Φ0X |Ψ0X 〉B |2) =: d0X , (23)
where p0X is the probability of choosing the setting 0X in the actual protocol. Depending on the assumptions on
Bob’s receiver, one might also include on the R.H.S. of Eq. (23) the probability, pXB , that Bob selects the X basis.
The LT protocol assumes that Bob’s measurements are independent from any event and identical, and thus pXB could
be included. However, for consistency with the discussion in the Methods section, which considers a general scenario,
here we prefer to conservatively use Eq. (23) which is an upper bound on the desired quantity independently on the
assumptions about Bob. This highlights the generality of the RT described in the Methods section. Finally, we obtain
the relationship for the actual states as
[
qsX |Id, qsX |x, qsX |z
]
=
[
Y
(Z)obs
sX,0Z |Act
P0ZPXB
,
Y
(Z)obs
sX,1Z |Act
P1ZPXB
,
Y
(X)obs
sX,0X |Act
+ w0X d0X
P0XPXB
] [
V T0Z , V
T
1Z , V
T
0X
]−1
. (24)
By solving this equation in terms of qsX |Id, qsX |x, and qsX |z, and by plugging their expressions into the yields, which
we have derived in Eqs. (17) and (22), we can express the phase error rate for the actual states as
eX =
Y
(Z)es
0X ,1X |Act + Y
(Z)es
1X ,0X |Act
Y
(Z)obs
0Z ,0Z |Act + Y
(Z)obs
1Z ,0Z |Act + Y
(Z)obs
0Z ,1Z |Act + Y
(Z)obs
1Z ,1Z |Act
. (25)
Note that −1 ≤ w0X ≤ 1 is chosen to maximise the phase error rate. Also, note that eX is a function of
d0X/
(
Y
(Z)obs
0Z ,0Z |Act + Y
(Z)obs
1Z ,0Z |Act + Y
(Z)obs
0Z ,1Z |Act + Y
(Z)obs
1Z ,1Z |Act
)
where the denominator represents the transmission efficiency
of the single-photons in the key generation basis. This means that, as expected, the deviation term d0X is enhanced
with channel losses due to the possibility of Eve performing a USD measurement [40, 41]. To clarify, an USD mea-
surement is not possible when the reference states are employed since they are linearly dependent, but it is possible
when the actual states are employed. This is so because the actual states are linearly independent due to the presence
of side-channel information. Moreover, we remark that the resulting upper bound on the phase error rate depends on
the particular reference states chosen, and in the simulations presented in the next section, we choose |Φ0X 〉B as the
state that is obtained by projecting |Ψ0X 〉B into the qubit space spanned by |Ψ0Z 〉B and |Ψ1Z 〉B .
E. Simulation of the secret key rate
To show the performance of QKD in the presence of pulse correlations we now present the simulation results. We
apply our method to three different frameworks: the GLT protocol [18], the RT described in the previous section and
the LP analysis [19], and we compare the results. We emphasise that pulse correlations are not taken into account in
[18, 19], however, we can apply our method to deal with pulse correlations to these security analyses. To be precise,
we simply consider a QKD protocol with the states in Eqs. (15), (16) and (26), and apply the GLT protocol and the
LP analysis. That is, besides pulse correlations we also include the effect of SPFs by assuming δ > 0 in Eq. (16).
In general, system B in Eqs. (15) and (16) can include more systems, not only those sent to Bob. Indeed, in these
equations the subscript B could be replaced by the subscript S := Ak+1, · · · , An, Bk, Bk+1, · · · , Bn, allowing us to
consider pulse correlations as the side-channel. Note that, to simplify the mathematical analysis we do not trace out
Alice’s subsequent systems Ak+1, · · · , An.
For the comparison between the three security analyses to be fair, the efficient four-state LT protocol is used in
the simulations. In other words, we suppose that Alice chooses randomly between two LT protocols where the third
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state sent in each of them is |Ψ0X 〉S and |Ψ1X 〉S , respectively. This means that the hardware required to implement
this scheme coincides with that of the BB84 protocol [27], making both protocols equivalent from an experimental
standpoint. Here, we assume that the phase modulation applied by Alice to her single-mode qubit states is proportional
to the chosen phase value, as in [18]. We define |Ψ1X 〉S as [18]
|Ψ1X 〉S = cos
(
3pi
4
+
3δ
4
)
|0Z〉S + sin
(
3pi
4
+
3δ
4
)
|1Z〉S . (26)
Furthermore, to illustrate the versatility of our technique we also plot the secret key rate for pulse correlations of
various ranges using the assumption given by Eq. (14) (see the Methods section), which results in a change in the
amplitude of the parameter  in Eq. (15).
In the asymptotic regime, the secret key rate formula for a single-photon source can be expressed as
R ≥ YZ (1− h(eX)− fh(eZ)) , (27)
where YZ is the single-photon yield in the Z basis, h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy
function, and f is the error correction efficiency. The term eX is the phase error rate and the term eZ is the bit error
rate. Note that, YZ and eZ are directly observed in a practical implementation of the protocol, but in the simulations
a channel model (see [18] for more details) is employed instead.
The experimental parameters used are: dark count rate of Bob’s detectors pd = 10
−7, f = 1.16 and the probabilities
for Alice and Bob to select the Z basis are, for simplicity, PZA = PZB =
1
2 . Unfortunately, there are no quantitative
works characterising pulse correlations (i.e., the value of the parameter ) therefore, for illustration purposes, we
select the values 10−3 and 10−6 to evaluate this imperfection. Also, in order to investigate how the length of the
pulse correlations affects the secret key rate, we consider the nearest neighbour correlation 1, as well as correlations
among two subsequent pulses, 2, and among ten subsequent pulses, 10 (see Eq. (14) for the definitions of these
epsilon parameters). Regarding SPFs, we choose δ = 0 and δ = 0.063 according to the experimental results reported
in [42–44]. The results are illustrated in Fig. 2.
As expected, this figure shows that when the magnitude of pulse correlations characterised by i increases the secret
key rate decreases. Also, as the length of the correlations taken into account increases the secret key rate drops. We
note, however, that even when long range correlations are considered, a secret key can still be obtained. Namely,
Fig. 2 shows that one can generate a secret key even when there are correlations between ten subsequent pulses in
all the parameter regimes investigated, when using the RT and the LP analysis. Clearly, for a smaller value of the
parameter i longer correlations can be included. In fact, if i is small enough, one can consider a very long range of
pulse correlations while guaranteeing the security of QKD.
We emphasise that the security proof selected highly affects the results obtained, and this is also illustrated in
Fig. 2, where we apply our technique to three different security analyses. In particular, this figure demonstrates the
good performance of the RT when applied to the original LT protocol. The reason is because the RT (see the Methods
section) provides a tighter estimation of the phase error rate, when compared with the two other security analyses,
and therefore a better performance. We remark that the RT approach is general and can be applied to other QKD
protocols as well. In simple terms, it allows us to quantify how far the actual states are from the reference states,
therefore constraining the amount of information that can be used by Eve to learn the secret key.
To compare the GLT protocol, the RT and the LP analysis as a function of pulse correlations one can examine
Figs. 2(a) and 2(b), or Figs. 2(c) and 2(d). Noticeably, as the magnitude of the pulse correlation i increases, the
secret key rate deteriorates for all of them. However, the RT outperforms the GLT protocol and the LP analysis in all
the parameter regimes investigated. By comparing Figs. 2(a) and 2(c), or Figs. 2(b) and 2(d), one can see the effect
of SPFs. As expected, the GLT protocol and the RT are barely affected by this imperfection since they are tolerant to
SPFs. However, the secret key rate for the LP analysis evidently decreases as SPFs increase. This happens because
in the LP analysis it is assumed that Eve can enhance her knowledge about the key by exploiting channel loss, but in
the GLT protocol and the RT this is circumvented and the performance is maintained. Importantly, even when there
are no SPFs the RT still performs better than the LP analysis. This suggests that the RT is the preferable security
proof when the emitted pulses are correlated. Most importantly, as explained above, our work shows that most of the
source imperfections can be taken into account through the parameter i, thus the RT performs better even when any
combination of the four main imperfections (i.e., SPFs, mode dependencies, THAs and pulse correlations) is present.
In summary, the results presented represent a big step forward towards achieving implementation security in QKD.
III. DISCUSSION
Security proofs of QKD have to consider source imperfections in the theoretical models. Fortunately, state
preparation flaws (SPFs), Trojan horse attacks [12–16] and mode dependencies have been considered together very
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Figure 2: Secret key rate R against the overall system loss measured in dB in the presence of correlations between
the emitted pulses when our method is applied to the generalised loss-tolerant (GLT) protocol [18], to the reference
technique (RT) for the original loss-tolerant protocol [17] and to the Lo-Preskill’s (LP) analysis [19]. In all graphs, the
blue, red and black lines are associated with the GLT protocol, the RT and the LP analysis, respectively. The solid
lines correspond to the nearest neighbour pulse correlations 1, while the dashed (dashed-dotted) lines correspond to
the second 2 (tenth 10) neighbour pulse correlations as indicated in the legend. (a) Even when there are no SPFs
and the parameter  is low, the RT outperforms the GLT protocol and the LP analysis. (b) As the parameter 
decreases, all security proofs provide a higher secret key rate but the RT is still superior. (c) In the presence of SPFs
the secret key rate is slightly worse in all cases. (d) For high SPFs and low , the RT is considerably better than
the GLT protocol and the LP analysis. Note that, in this figure the black lines cannot be distinguished with the
resolution presented.
recently in [18]. In this work, we have introduced a general framework to deal with pulse correlations, which are
the last piece required for securing the source. Importantly, our framework is compatible with those security proofs
that incorporate other source imperfections, and therefore it can be used to guarantee implementation security with
arbitrary flawed devices, by combining it with measurement-device-independent QKD [5] and the results in [18]. The
key idea is interpreting the information encoded in the subsequent pulses as a side-channel information. By doing so,
we have shown that, as long as the magnitude of the correlations is small, a secret key can still be obtained even when
there are correlations over a long range of pulses. Moreover, our framework can be directly applied in combination
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with existing security proofs such as the generalised loss-tolerant (GLT) protocol, the Lo-Preskill’s (LP) analysis [19]
and the numerical techniques recently introduced in [21–23].
Furthermore, we have proposed a new security proof, which we call the reference technique (RT). It uses reference
states that are similar to the states sent in the actual protocol, thus allowing us to determine the observables needed
to prove the security of the latter. We have shown that by applying this technique to the original loss-tolerant (LT)
protocol [17] one can obtain high secret key rates in the presence of pulse correlations. Since we have demonstrated
that most of the source imperfections can be incorporated together into the framework presented, we conclude that
the RT based on the original LT protocol maintains a high performance in the presence of source imperfections.
We have not considered the decoy-state method [2–4] in this work, and, therefore, the imperfections of the intensity
modulator have not been included. However, we remark that our framework could be combined with the decoy-state
method to ensure the security of arbitrarily flawed sources. This problem is however beyond the scope of this paper.
To show the applicability of our method, we have compared the GLT protocol, the RT and the LP analysis, and we
have investigated which security proof results in a higher secret key rate as a function of pulse correlations and SPFs.
For the experimental parameters selected, we have confirmed that the RT outperforms the other security proofs in all
cases. The dramatic difference observed in Fig. 2 between the GLT protocol and the RT in the presence of imperfect
sources arises because of two main reasons. First, recall that in [18] the upper bounds on the virtual yields and on the
actual yields are obtained by calculating certain eigenvalues and thus they entail square root terms, which deteriorate
the secret key rate. Note that, in the trace distance argument [15], square root terms are also present. However, with
the RT these terms do not appear and a high performance is maintained. The other reason comes from the fact that
most of the upper bounds on the virtual and the actual yields used in the GLT protocol are avoidable with the RT. In
fact, when employing the RT we only obtain one upper bound on the actual yields associated with the setting choice
0X . Remarkably, the RT combines the advantages of the GLT protocol and the LP analysis, and guarantees high
secret key rates in the presence of flawed, leaky and correlated sources. Therefore, it seems to be the most suitable
security analysis to prove the security of practical QKD.
IV. METHODS
A. Reference technique
In this section, we present the RT in detail. This technique can be applied to many QKD protocols. In simple
terms, we consider a set of ideal states called the reference states, which serve as a reference to the actual states
one actually uses. Given that the reference states and the actual states are sufficiently close to each other, then the
probability for each event obtained with the reference states should be similar to that obtained with the actual states.
Therefore, a relationship between the probabilities associated with events when employing the reference states can be
used as a tool to estimate the required quantities to prove the security of the actual protocol. Below, we formalise
our idea and outline its application.
Let us assume an actual m-state protocol where Alice chooses, with probability pj , a state from the set
{|ψj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m, where the state |ψj〉B is normalised, for each pulse emission. We also assume that the key is
generated from a subset of states indexed by j = 1, · · · ,mkey, where mkey is the number of states used for generating
the secret key. In order to prove the security of this actual protocol, one exploits another set of normalised states
{|φj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m, which we call the reference states, where each |φj〉B is chosen to be close to the state |ψj〉B . For
instance, suppose that the set of actual states is {|0Z〉B , |1Z〉B ,
√
1−  |0X〉B +
√
 |0⊥X〉B} with 0 <  ≤ 1, where the
parameter  quantifies the deviation from the qubit space spanned by {|0Z〉B , |1Z〉B}, |0X〉B is a qubit state living
in this space and |0⊥X〉B is a state living in any Hilbert space orthogonal to the qubit state. Then, we may select the
set of reference states as {|0Z〉B , |1Z〉B , |0X〉B}, where all the states are now qubit states. Importantly, the set of the
reference states should be chosen such that a relationship between the probabilities of the events associated with the
reference states can be easily obtained. Intuitively, since each state |φj〉B is close to the state |ψj〉B , the probabilities
of any measurement outcome associated to these two states should be close to each other. Therefore, we are able to
obtain the required observables for the security proof of the actual protocol by slightly modifying the relationship
between the probabilities associated with the reference states. In what follows, we make this intuition rigorous.
Also, we remark that our security proof does not require the run of a protocol in which Alice employs the reference
states, we just exploit them as a mathematical tool to establish a relationship in terms of the probabilities of the
events in the actual protocol, that are needed for the security proof. The recipe to obtain a relationship for the
observables required to prove the security of the actual protocol can be summarised as follows.
1. Assume that the actual protocol can be converted into an entanglement-based virtual protocol, in which Alice’s
choices j and the quantum states |ψj〉B sent to Bob are the same as those in the actual protocol. In such virtual
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protocol, Alice sends all the systems B to Bob over a quantum channel, and afterwards they start to measure
their systems in order. That is, we consider a delayed measurement by Alice and Bob.
2. Employ a security proof where an upper bound on a physical quantity needs to be estimated, such as the number
of phase errors within the detected events.
3. In order to estimate the physical quantity defined in step 2, consider a particular round of Alice’s and Bob’s
measurements (say the kth round) in the virtual protocol and assume the most general attack that might be
performed by an eavesdropper. Now, we imagine replacing only the kth actual pulses with the reference states,
and we select these reference states appropriately such that by exploiting the security proof employed in step 2
the following relationship holds
0 ≤ f(P (k)(qes|Ref), {P (k)(qobsγ,j |Ref)}γ=1,2,··· ;j=1,2,··· ,m) . (28)
Here, qes (qobsγ,j , with Alice’s setting choice j and Bob’s measurement result and basis choice γ) stands for an
estimated (observed) quantity, which is a joint event that includes a detection event, the term Ref refers to the
selection of the reference states, and f is a concave function with respect to its variables obeying the following
property
1
N
f({xg}g=1,2,···) ≤ f({xg/N}g=1,2,···) , (29)
where N is a positive integer. Importantly, P (k)(qes|Ref) is the fictitious probability that the physical quantity
required in the security proof would occur at the kth round if the set of the actual states at the kth round only
is replaced with the reference states. In other words, this fictitious probability is conditional on the reference
states rather than on the actual states. Similarly, {P (k)(qobsγ,j |Ref)}γ=1,2,··· ;j=1,2,··· ,m is a set of fictitious
probabilities associated to events (which would be directly accessible in an experimental implementation) that
would occur at the kth round if the set of the actual states at the kth round only is replaced with the reference
states.
4. Transform the relationship for the reference states in Eq. (28) to a relationship in terms of events associated to
the actual states. This is done by just replacing the probabilities in Eq. (28) with the probabilities in the actual
protocol. To be precise, we modify Eq. (28) as
0 ≤ max
ωkey,ωj
f(P (k)(qes) + ωkeydkey, {P (k)(qobsγ,j ) + ωjdj}γ=1,2,··· ;j=1,2,··· ,m) , (30)
where ωkey and ωj are real numbers satisfying −1 ≤ ωkey ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ ωj ≤ 1, which are chosen such that
they maximise the R.H.S. of Eq. (30). This maximisation results in the parameters wkey,max and wj,max, which
are used from this point onwards. Note that, if the maximisation at this stage is difficult, say due to a lack of
knowledge about the probabilities, we can postpone it until Eq. (35). In Eq. (30),
dkey :=
mkey∑
i=1
pi
1−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
mkey∑
j=1
A 〈j|B 〈ψj |
(mkey∑
i=1
|i〉A |φi〉B
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
/
mkey∑
j=1
pj

 , (31)
dj := pj
(
1− |B 〈ψj |φj〉B |2
)
, (32)
where A is Alice’s ancilla system employed in the entanglement-based virtual protocol and {|j〉A}j=1,2,··· ,m is
an orthogonal basis with A〈j |i〉A = δj,ipj (in which δj,i is the Kronecker delta). Moreover, as already mentioned
above, mkey is the number of states in the set {|ψj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m that are involved in the key generation basis,
i.e., in defining the phase error rate. For instance, in the standard security proof of the BB84 scheme [27] or in
the LT protocol [17], the phase errors are defined in the Z basis, hence mkey = 2 in these cases. Note that, dkey
and dj depend on the inner product between the reference states and the actual states, therefore their value
depends on the reference states selected.
5. Now, we concentrate on a round that results in a detected event, i.e., when Bob obtains a bit value. Let us
redefine such a round as k, and divide the inequality in Eq. (30) by the probability of obtaining a detected event
P (k)(qdet):
0 ≤ f(P (k)(qes|det) + ωkey,maxd(k)key|det, {P (k)(qobsγ,j |det) + ωj,maxd(k)j|det}γ=1,2,··· ;j=1,2,··· ,m) , (33)
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where P (k)(qes|det) is the probability that the quantity that has to be estimated occurs at the kth round
conditional on a detection event. Note that, since only rounds with detected events are being considered,
P (k)(qdet) 6= 0 holds. The probability P (k)(qobsγ,j |det) is defined similarly. In Eq. (33), d(k)key|det (d(k)j|det) is the
maximum deviation between the probability of an estimated (observed) quantity when using the reference states
and the actual states, conditional on a detection event. Also, we note that to derive Eq. (33) we used the property
of the function f stated in Eq. (29).
6. Transform Eq. (33) to an inequality in terms of the number of occurrences (instead of probabilities) by exploiting
the properties of the function f as well as some probability inequality. First, take a summation over k =
1, 2, · · · , Ndet, where Ndet denotes the number of detected events, and write
0 ≤ f
(
Ndet∑
k=1
P (k)(qes|det) + ωkey,max
Ndet∑
k=1
d
(k)
key|det,{
Ndet∑
k=1
P (k)(qobsγ,j |det) + ωj,max
Ndet∑
k=1
d
(k)
j|det
}
γ=1,2,··· ;j=1,2,··· ,m
)
, (34)
where the Jensen’s inequality [45] for concave functions was used. Next, apply some probability inequality, such
as, for example, the Azuma’s inequality [36], to
∑Ndet
k=1 P
(k)(qes|det),
∑Ndet
k=1 P
(k)(qobsj,γ |det),
∑Ndet
k=1 d
(k)
key|det and∑Ndet
k=1 d
(k)
j|det. The goal is to relate the expected number of events to the actual number of events. As a result,
the actual numbers of the corresponding events, which we denote by N(qes|det), N(qobsj,γ |det), N(dkey|det) and
N(dj|det) can be obtained. Such estimation is typically valid except for an exponentially small probability in
Ndet. The last two actual numbers of events cannot be accessed directly from an experimental implementation
of the protocol. Therefore, to estimate them one can assume the worst case scenario, in which all the events
associated with dkey and dj among all signals emitted by Alice (not only the signals detected) are accumulated
into the detection events. Now, the final task is to estimate upper bounds on the numbers N(dkey) and N(dj).
For this, one can employ some probability inequality whose estimations succeed except for an exponential small
probability in N , where N is the total number of trials (i.e., it is the number of pulses emitted in the protocol).
For example, one can apply the Chernoff bound [46] by using the mean values dkey and dj given by Eqs. (31)
and (32), respectively. As a result, we obtain upper bounds on the actual number of events associated with dkey
and dj , N(dkey) and N(dj), as Ndkey and Ndj plus some deviation terms, respectively. Eq. (34) can now be
written in terms of the actual number of occurrences:
0 ≤ f(N(qes|det) + ωkey,maxNdkey, {N(qobsγ,j |det) + ωj,maxNdj}γ=1,2,··· ;j=1,2,··· ,m,) , (35)
where, for simplicity, the deviation terms due to the probability inequalities employed are omitted. Finally, to
estimate the phase error rate one divides Eq. (35) by Ndet and obtains
0 ≤ f
(
N(qes|det)
Ndet
+ ωkey,max
Ndkey
Ndet
,
{
N(qobsγ,j |det)
Ndet
+ ωj,max
Ndj
Ndet
}
γ=1,2,··· ;j=1,2,··· ,m,
)
. (36)
This expression, which holds except for an exponentially small probability in Ndet and N , can be used to
establish the security of the actual protocol.
The steps 3 and 4 are the most important parts in the recipe presented above, while all the other steps are quite
standard and often employed in security proofs [47]. The key point in the RT is given by Eqs. (30)-(32). For instance,
Eq. (31) essentially states that the maximum deviation between the probability of an event associated to the actual
states {|ψj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m and to the reference states {|φj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m can never be larger than dkey, and the same
statement holds for dj in Eq. (32). In the main text we have shown how to apply this RT to a particular example.
Below, we justify and explain the recipe presented, making special emphasis on steps 3 and 4.
To prove the security of the actual protocol, we consider a particular round of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements (say
the kth round) in the entanglement-based virtual protocol and assume that Eve performs a coherent attack. As the
entangled state that Alice prepares in the actual protocol we take |Act〉AB :=
∑m
j=1 |j〉A |ψj〉B , and we also consider
the entangled state for the reference states as |Ref〉AB :=
∑m
j=1 |j〉A |φj〉B . Here, A is Alice’s virtual system, and
〈i| j〉 = δj,ipj , where pj is the probability that Alice chooses the setting j in the actual protocol. In particular, we
consider the probabilities P (k)(qes|Act) and P (k)(qobsγ,j |Act), where Act is used to emphasise that these probabilities
are defined for the actual states. Moreover, we have that these probabilities depend on Alice’s, Eve’s and Bob’s
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measurement outcomes due to Eve’s attack and the measurements performed by Alice and Bob on those systems
different from the kth pulse. Now, the goal is to obtain the deviations between the probabilities associated with the
actual states and with the reference states:∣∣P (k)(qes|Act)− P (k)(qes|Ref)∣∣ , (37)∣∣P (k)(qobsγ,j |Act)− P (k)(qobsγ,j |Ref)∣∣ . (38)
That is, we are interested in the maximum deviation between these probabilities if we only replace the kth actual
state with the corresponding reference state.
Let us first consider Eq. (37). In order to achieve the maximum deviation, we assume the worst case scenario,
where all the systems AB different from the kth system are possessed and completely controlled by Eve, as well as
her own systems. The state of all the systems in Eve’s hands can be expressed by a pure state, which we denote by
|0〉E . This means that the deviation derived in this scenario can never be enhanced.
Recall that the event qes is associated with the secret key generation, and therefore it only occurs when the setting
choice is the key generation states indexed by j = 1, · · · ,mkey. Hence, the probability P (k)(qes|Act) (P (k)(qes|Ref))
can be decomposed into a product of two probabilities, the first one is the probability of selecting the key generation
basis, which is pkey =
∑mkey
j=1 pj , and the second one is the probability of obtaining such event qes conditional on the
selection of the key generation basis. To consider the latter probability, we define the actual entangled state in the
virtual protocol conditional on selecting the key generation basis to be
∑mkey
j=1 |j〉A |ψj〉B /
√
pkey =: |key|Act〉AB , and
similarly the conditional state for the reference states is defined as
∑mkey
i=1 |i〉A |φi〉B /
√
pkey =: |key|Ref〉AB . Since
the most general measurement that can be performed on the composite system formed by the kth pulse and all the
other systems presumed to be in Eve’s hands (whose states are |key|Ref〉AB |0〉E and |key|Act〉AB |0〉E), is simply a
projection measurement, we have that∣∣P (k)(qes|Act)− P (k)(qes|Ref)∣∣ ≤ pkey∣∣P (l| |key|Act〉AB |0〉E)− P (l| |key|Ref〉AB |0〉E)∣∣
≤ pkey
1−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
mkey∑
j=1
A 〈j|B 〈ψj |
(mkey∑
i=1
|i〉A |φi〉B
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
/ pkey

=: dkey, (39)
holds for any outcome l associated to any measurement performed by Alice, Eve, and Bob. Here, P (l| |key|Act〉AB |0〉E)
(P (l| |key|Ref〉AB |0〉E)) is the probability of obtaining the optimal measurement outcome l, which maximises the
deviation, given the actual (reference) state |key|Act〉AB |0〉E (|key|Ref〉AB |0〉E). Similarly, we have that∣∣P (k)(qobsj,γ |Act)− P (k)(qobsj,γ |Ref)∣∣ ≤ pj∣∣P (l| |ψj〉B |0〉E)− P (l| |φj〉B |0〉E)∣∣
≤ pj
(
1− |B 〈ψj |φj〉B |2
)
=: dj , (40)
where we have used the fact that the event qobsj,γ involves Alice’s setting choice j.
Note that, in both Eqs. (39) and (40) we could have included the probability associated with Bob’s basis choice.
For instance, if Bob’s measurements are independent, i.e., Bob’s measurement operators over all the pulses received
are expressed by a tensor product in terms of each of the pulses and his basis choice for each of the measurements
is independent, then we could multiply Bob’s probability on the R.H.S. of Eqs. (39) and (40). However, the RT also
applies when this condition is not assumed. In other words, the RT could be used with security proofs where the
independence of Bob’s measurements is not guaranteed, such as, for example, when there are correlations between
Bob’s measurements.
Since all the reference states are chosen such that they satisfy Eq. (28), we now have an inequality for the actual
protocol of the form given by Eq. (33) by appropriately choosing the parameters ωkey,max and ωj,max. The rest of the
security proof runs according to the standard approach presented in the steps 5 and 6 above.
We emphasise that, the RT is also valid for mixed states. In general, mixed states can be purified by introducing
Alice’s and Eve’s ancilla systems. That is, the system B in the actual states {|ψj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m and in the reference
states {|φj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m would now include all the systems that Alice prepares, namely, her ancilla system, which is
kept in her lab, together with the system to be sent to Bob, as well as Eve’s system. After performing this purification,
the recipe presented above applies directly.
Note that, as shown in Eq. (36), the phase error rate obtained is a function of dkey/η and dj/η, where η :=
Ndet/N is the overall transmission efficiency of the system. In other words, the imperfections of the actual states
{|ψj〉B}j=1,2,··· ,m are unavoidably enhanced with channel loss, due to the existence of an USD measurement [40, 41].
In a practical implementation of QKD, source imperfections are always present, thus the actual states prepared by
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Alice are typically linearly independent. In this practical case (i.e., when the prepared states are linearly independent)
the RT provides a high secret key rate as shown in Fig. 2. However, if the source can prepare linearly dependent
states then the RT does not help and it might be beneficial to employ another security analysis. For instance, if Alice
prepares linearly dependent states and there are SPFs one can use the original LT protocol [17], since this protocol
does not suffer from the enhancement with channel loss, resulting in a better performance.
B. Arbitrarily long range pulse correlations
In this section, we show how to extend our analysis to accommodate arbitrarily long range correlations between the
pulses. To simplify the discussion, we consider the three-state protocol, but this formalism can be easily extended to
any number of states. Our starting point is the assumption in Eq. (14). We rewrite it here for convenience,∣∣
Bk 〈ψjk|jk−1,··· ,jw+1,j˜w,jw−1,··· ,j1 |ψjk|jk−1,··· ,jw+1,jw,jw−1,··· ,j1〉Bk
∣∣2 ≥ 1− k−w, (41)
where k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and 1 ≤ w ≤ k − 1. Note that the difference between both states is in the jthw index. Also,
the R.H.S. of Eq. (41) does not depend on the indices jk, jk−1, · · · , j1 and j˜w, and the term k − w is associated with
the correlation under consideration. For example, when k−w = 1 it refers to the nearest neighbour pulse correlation
considered in the Results section. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we can assume the relation
Bk 〈ψjk|jk−1,··· ,jw+1,jw,jw−1,··· ,j1 |ψjk|jk−1,··· ,jw+1,0X ,jw−1,··· ,j1〉Bk ≥ 0, (42)
after appropriately choosing the phase of the state |jw〉Aw . Using these assumptions, an extension of our framework is
now presented. That is, we show how to obtain a lower bound on the parameter aj in Eq. (1) starting from Eq. (41).
More generally, the entangled state prepared by Alice, shown in Eq. (2), can now be written as
|Ψ〉AB :=
∑
jn
· · ·
∑
j1
n⊗
ζ=1
|jζ〉Aζ |ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,j1〉Bζ , (43)
where jζ ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X} and ζ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Note that, j0 represents having no condition, and the state
|ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,j1〉Bζ represents the long range pulse correlations, that is, the state of the ζth pulse depends on all the
previous setting choices. As before, we suppose that Alice measures her ancilla systems up to the kth pulse. More
precisely, she measures the first k − 1 systems of {Aζ}ζ={1,2,··· ,n} by using the computational basis. The whole
(unnormalised) state can then be expressed as
|Ψj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉AB :=
(
k−1⊗
ζ˜=1
|j′
ζ˜
〉
Aζ˜
|ψj′
ζ˜
|j′
ζ˜−1,··· ,j
′
1
〉
Bζ˜
)
⊗
∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk|j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bk
⊗
(∑
jn
· · ·
∑
jk+1
n⊗
ζ=k+1
|jζ〉Aζ |ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,jk+1,jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bζ
)
. (44)
To clarify, after Alice’s measurement, the state |Ψ〉AB in Eq. (43) becomes the state |Ψj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉AB in Eq. (44),
where the subscripts indicate its dependence on the previous measurement results j′k−1, · · · , j′1. Note that, Eq. (44)
corresponds to Eq. (6) in the Results section.
Now, similarly to our analysis for the nearest neighbour pulse correlations, in order to see how the information jk
is encoded in the state |Ψj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉AB , defined in Eq. (44), we rewrite it as
|Ψj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉AB =
(
k−1⊗
ζ˜=1
|j′
ζ˜
〉
Aζ˜
|ψj′
ζ˜
|j′
ζ˜−1,··· ,j
′
1
〉
Bζ˜
)
⊗
∑
jk
|jk〉Ak |ψjk|j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bk
⊗
(
ajk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 |Φj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn + bjk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 |Φ
⊥
jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn
)
, (45)
where |Φj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn , and |Φ
⊥
jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn are normalised states, and
|Φj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn is orthogonal to |Φ
⊥
jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn . Recall that, the subscripts in the
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variables, e.g. ajk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 , bjk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 , or in the state |Ψj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉AB , indicate their dependence on previous results.
Importantly, the state |Φj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn does not depend on jk but |Φ
⊥
jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn
does. In other words, |Φ⊥jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn is the side-channel information for jk. Furthermore, note that
|ψjk|j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bk and |Φj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn in Eq. (45) correspond to |ψjk〉Bk and |φ〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn
in Eq. (11), respectively. Similarly, |ψjk|j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bk ⊗ |Φ
⊥
jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn in Eq. (45) corresponds to
|ψ⊥jk|j′k−1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk,Bk+1,··· ,Bn in Eq. (11).
Next, we obtain a lower bound on the coefficient ajk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 . For |Φj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn , one may choose
a state such that it becomes independent of jk. One of such choices could be
|Φj′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Ak+1,··· ,An,Bk+1,··· ,Bn :=
∑
jn
· · ·
∑
jk+1
n⊗
ζ=k+1
|jζ〉Aζ |ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,jk+1,0X ,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bζ , (46)
which is the state of the last (n−k) systems in Eq. (44) with only the kth index of |ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,jk+1,jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bζ being
fixed to 0X . Importantly, this state is independent of jk. Since ajk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 is equal to the inner product between
the state given by Eq. (46) and the vector∑
jn
· · ·
∑
jk+1
n⊗
ζ=k+1
|jζ〉Aζ |ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,jk+1,jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bζ , (47)
which is the expression in the last parenthesis of Eq. (44), we can evaluate a lower bound for ajk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 as
|ajk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 | =
∣∣∣∣∑
jn
· · ·
∑
jk+1
n∏
ζ=k+1
pjζ Bζ 〈ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,jk+1,0X ,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 |ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,jk+1,jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bζ
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
jn
· · ·
∑
jk+1
n∏
ζ=k+1
pjζ
∣∣
Bζ 〈ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,jk+1,0X ,j′k−1,··· ,j′1 |ψjζ |jζ−1,··· ,jk+1,jk,j′k−1,··· ,j′1〉Bζ
∣∣
≥
∑
jn
· · ·
∑
jk+1
n∏
ζ=k+1
pjζ (1− ζ−k)1/2
=
n−k∏
ζ=1
(1− ζ)1/2. (48)
In the second equality we use the result given by Eq. (42) and the inequality comes from Eq. (41).
C. Coefficients
In this section, we provide the explicit expressions for the coefficients of the Bloch vector. Direct calculation shows
that these coefficients can be expressed as
PαX ,esx = (−1)α
√
1− (1− )4 sin
(
δ
2
)
,
PαX ,esz = −(−1)α(1− )2 sin
(
δ
2
)
,
P 0Z ,obsx = 0,
P 0Z ,obsz = 1, (49)
P 1Z ,obsx = −2(1− )2 sin
δ
2
√
1− (1− )4 sin
(
δ
2
)
,
P 1Z ,obsz = 2(1− )4 sin
(
δ
2
)
− 1,
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P 0X ,obsx =
2(1− ) cos(pi+δ4 )C
(1− )2 cos2(pi+δ4 ) + C2
,
P 0X ,obsz =
(1− )2 cos2(pi+δ4 )− C2
(1− )2 cos2(pi+δ4 ) + C2
,
where the parameter C is given by
C =
(1− )2 sin(pi−δ4 )+ (1− )4 sin( δ2) cos(pi+δ4 )√
1− (1− )4 sin2( δ2 )
. (50)
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Guillermo Curra´s Lorenzo for very valuable discussions. This work was supported by the Spanish
Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO), the Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) through
the grant TEC2017-88243-R, and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under
the Marie Sk lodowska-Curie grant agreement No 675662 (project QCALL). K.T. acknowledges support from JSPS
KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP18H05237 18H05237 and JST-CREST JPMJCR 1671.
[1] Lo, H.-K., Curty, M. & Tamaki, K. Secure quantum key distribution. Nature Photonics 8, 595–604 (2014).
[2] Hwang, W.-Y. Quantum key distribution with high loss: Toward global secure communication. Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901
(2003).
[3] Lo, H.-K., Ma, X. & Chen, K. Decoy state quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230504 (2005).
[4] Wang, X.-B. Beating the photon-number-splitting attack in practical quantum cryptography. Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503
(2005).
[5] Lo, H.-K., Curty, M. & Qi, B. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503
(2012).
[6] Rubenok, A., Slater, J. A., Chan, P., Lucio-Martinez, I. & Tittel, W. Real-world two-photon interference and proof-of-
principle quantum key distribution immune to detector attacks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 130501 (2013).
[7] da Silva, T. F. et al. Proof-of-principle demonstration of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution using
polarization qubits. Phys. Rev. A 88, 052303 (2013).
[8] Liu, Y. et al. Experimental measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 130502
(2013).
[9] Tang, Z. et al. Experimental demonstration of polarization encoding measurement-device-independent quantum key dis-
tribution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 190503 (2014).
[10] Yin, H.-L. et al. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution over a 404 km optical fiber. Phys. Rev. Lett.
117, 190501 (2016).
[11] Comandar, L. C. et al. Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers. Nature
Photonics 10, 312–315 (2016).
[12] Gisin, N., Fasel, S., Kraus, B., Zbinden, H. & Ribordy, G. Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems.
Phys. Rev. A 73, 022320 (2006).
[13] Vakhitov, A., Makarov, V. & Hjelme, D. R. Large pulse attack as a method of conventional optical eavesdroppong in
quantum cryptography. J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2023 (2001).
[14] Lucamarini, M., Choi, I., Ward, M. B., Yuan, J. F. D. Z. L. & Shields, A. J. Practical security bounds against the
trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. X 5, 031030 (2015).
[15] Tamaki, K., Curty, M. & Lucamarini, M. Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source. New Journal of
Physics 18, 065008 (2016).
[16] Wang, W., Tamaki, K. & Curty, M. Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources. New
Journal of Physics 20, 083027 (2018).
[17] Tamaki, K., Curty, M., Kato, G., Lo, H.-K. & Azuma, K. Loss-tolerant quantum cryptography with imperfect sources.
Phys. Rev. A 90, 052314 (2014).
[18] Pereira, M., Curty, M. & Tamaki, K. Quantum key distribution with flawed and leaky sources. npj Quantum Information
5, 62 (2019).
[19] Lo, H.-K. & Preskill, J. Security of quantum key distribution using weak coherent states with nonrandom phases. Quantum
Inf. Comput. 7, 431–458 (2007).
[20] Gottesman, D., Lo, H.-K., Lu¨tkenhaus, N. & Preskill, J. Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices.
Quantum Inf. Comput. 7, 431 (2007).
19
[21] Wang, Y., Primaatmaja, I. W., Lavie, E., Varvitsiotis, A. & Lim, C. C. W. Characterising the correlations of prepare-
and-measure quantum networks. npj Quantum Information 5, 17 (2019).
[22] Coles, P. J., Metodiev, E. M. & Lu¨tkenhaus, N. Numerical approach for unstructured quantum key distribution. Nature
Communications 7 (2016).
[23] Winick, A., Lu¨tkenhaus, N. & Coles, P. J. Reliable numerical key rates for quantum key distribution. Quantum 2, 77
(2018).
[24] Nagamatsu, Y. et al. Security of quantum key distribution with light sources that are not independently and identically
distributed. Phys. Rev. A 93, 042325 (2016).
[25] Mizutani, A. et al. Quantum key distribution with setting-choice-independently correlated light sources. npj Quantum
Information 5, 8 (2019).
[26] Yoshino, K.-i. et al. Quantum key distribution with an efficient countermeasure against correlated intensity fluctuations
in optical pulses. npj Quantum Information 4, 8 (2018).
[27] Bennett, C. H. & Brassard, G. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing. In Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, 175–179 (1984).
[28] Bruss, D. Optimal eavesdropping in quantum cryptography with six states. Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018–3021 (1998).
[29] Scarani, V., Ac´ın, A., Ribordy, G. & Gisin, N. Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting
attacks for weak laser pulse implementations. Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004).
[30] Inoue, K., Waks, E. & Yamamoto, Y. Differential phase shift quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 037902
(2002).
[31] Takesue, H. et al. Quantum key distribution over a 40-db channel loss using superconducting single-photon detectors.
Nature Photonics 1, 343–348 (2007).
[32] Stucki, D., Brunner, N., Gisin, N., Scarani, V. & Zbinden, H. Fast and simple one-way quantum key distribution. Applied
Physics Letters 87, 194108 (2005).
[33] Lydersen, L. et al. Hacking commercial quantum cryptographic systems by tailored bright illumination. Nature Photonics
4, 686–698 (2010).
[34] Gerhardt, I. et al. Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system. Nature
Communications 2, 349 (2011).
[35] Fung, C.-H. F., Tamaki, K., Qi, B., Lo, H.-K. & Ma, X. Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency
mismatch. Quantum Inf. Comput. 9, 0131–0165 (2009).
[36] Azuma, K. Weighted sums of certain dependent random variables. Tohoku Mathematical Journal 19, 357–367 (1967).
[37] Christandl, M., Ko¨nig, R. & Renner, R. Postselection technique for quantum channels with applications to quantum
cryptography. Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 020504 (2009).
[38] Dupuis, F., Fawzi, O. & Renner, R. Entropy accumulation. preprint arXiv:1607.01796 (2016).
[39] Cao, Z., Zhang, Z., Lo, H.-K. & Ma, X. Discrete-phase-randomized coherent state source and its application in quantum
key distribution. New Journal of Physics 17, 053014 (2015).
[40] Chefles, A. & Barnett, S. M. Optimum unambiguous discrimination between linearly independent symmetric states.
Physics Letters A 250, 223 – 229 (1998).
[41] Dusˇek, M., Jahma, M. & Lu¨tkenhaus, N. Unambiguous state discrimination in quantum cryptography with weak coherent
states. Phys. Rev. A 62, 022306 (2000).
[42] Xu, F., Qi, B. & Lo, H.-K. Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution
system. New J. Phys. 12, 113026 (2010).
[43] Honjo, T., Inoue, K. & Takahashi, H. Differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution experiment with a planar light-wave
circuit mach–zehnder interferometer. Opt. Lett. 29, 2797–2799 (2004).
[44] Li, G. Recent advances in coherent optical communication. Adv. Opt. Photon. 1, 279–307 (2009).
[45] Jensen, J. L. W. V. Sur les fonctions convexes et les ine´galite´s entre les valeurs moyennes. Acta Mathematica 30 (1906).
[46] Chernoff, H. A measure of asymptotic efficiency for tests of a hypothesis based on the sum of observations. Ann. Math.
Statist. 23, 493–507 (1952).
[47] Boileau, J.-C., Tamaki, K., Batuwantudawe, J., Laflamme, R. & Renes, J. M. Unconditional security of a three state
quantum key distribution protocol. Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 040503 (2005).
